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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be
released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the
time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of
the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of
Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v.
Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CITY OF BURLINGTON v. DAGUE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 91-810.   Argued April 21, 1992-Decided June 24, 1992

After ruling on the merits for respondents, the District Court
determined that they were "substantially prevailing" parties
entitled to "reasonable" attorney's fees under the attorney's fee
provisions of the Solid Waste Disposal Act and the Clean Water
Act. The District Court calculated the fee award by, inter alia,
enhancing the "lode star" amount by 25% on the grounds that
respondents' attorneys were retained on a contingent-fee basis
and that without such enhancement respondents would have faced
substantial difficulties in obtaining suitable counsel.  The
Court of Appeals affirmed the fee award.

Held: The fee-shifting statutes at issue do not permit
enhancement of a fee award beyond the lodestar amount to reflect
the fact that a party's attorneys were retained on a
contingent-fee basis. In Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (Delaware Valley
II), this Court addressed, but did not resolve, a question
essentially identical to the one presented here. The position
taken by the principal opinion in that case, id., at 723-727
(opinion of White, J.) -that the typical federal fee-shifting
statute does not permit an attorney's fee award to be enhanced on
account of contingency- is adopted.  The position advocated by
Delaware Valley II's concurrence, id., at 731, 733 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) -that contingency
enhancement is appropriate in defined limited circumstances- is
rejected, since it is based upon propositions that are mutually
inconsistent as a practical matter; would make enhancement turn
upon a circular test for a very large proportion of
contingency-fee cases; and could not possibly  achieve its
supposed goal of mirroring market incentives to attorneys  to
take cases.  Beyond that approach, there is no other basis,
fairly derivable from the fee-shifting statutes, by which
contingency enhancement, if adopted, could be restricted to fewer
than all contingent-fee cases.  Moreover, contingency enhancement
is not compatible with the fee-shifting statutes at issue, since
such enhancement would in effect pay for the attorney's time (or
anticipated time) in cases where his client does not prevail; is
unnecessary to the determination of a reasonable fee and
inconsistent with this Court's general rejection of the

contingent-fee model in favor of the lodestar model, see,  e. g.,
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96; and would make the
setting of fees more complex and arbitrary, hence more
unpredictable, and hence more litigable.  Pp.3-9.
935 F.2d 1343, reversed in part.

Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ.,
joined.  Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Stevens, J., joined.
O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

[June 24, 1992]

 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.

 This case presents the question whether a court, in determining
an award of reasonable attorney's fees under 7002(e) of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 90 Stat. 2826, as amended, 42 U. S. C.
6972(e), or 505(d) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(Clean Water Act (CWA)), 86 Stat. 889, as amended, 33 U. S. C.
1365(d), may enhance the fee award above the -lodestar- amount in
order to reflect the fact that the party's attorneys were
retained on a contingent-fee basis and thus assumed the risk of
receiving no payment at all for their services. Although
different fee-shifting statutes are involved, the question is
essentially identical to the one we addressed, but did not
resolve, in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for
Clean Air, 483 U. S. 711 (1987) (Delaware Valley II).

/* Opinions on attorneys fees are always carefully read by
attorneys and the governments and other potential payors of these
fees. For the few uninitiated persons let's define the terms.
"Lodestar" refers to a calculation of fees as follows-- a
reasonable hourly rate multiplied by a reasonable number of
hours.
"Enhancement" is a multiplier to the lodestar calculation which
has been allowed in the past for attorneys taking cases on
contingent fees to reflect the extra risk that they take when
taking on a case in which the fee is dependent on winning. */


I

  Respondent Dague (whom we will refer to in place of all the
respondents) owns land in Vermont adjacent to a landfill that was
owned and operated by petitioner City of Burlington.  Represented
by attorneys retained on a contingent-fee basis, he sued
Burlington over its operation of the landfill.  The District
Court ruled, inter alia, that Burlington had violated provisions
of the SWDA and the CWA, and ordered Burlington to close the
landfill by January 1, 1990.  It also determined that Dague was a
-substantially prevailing party-  entitled to an award of
attorney's fees under the Acts, see 42 U. S. C. 6972(e); 33 U. S.
C. 1365(d).  732 F. Supp. 458 (Vt. 1989).


  In calculating the attorney's fees award, the District Court
first found reasonable the figures advanced by Dague for his
attorneys' hourly rates and for the number of hours expended by
them, producing a resulting -lodestar- attorney's fee of
$198,027.50.  (What our cases have termed the -lodestar- is -the
product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate,-
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air,
478 U. S. 546, 565 (1986) (Delaware Valley I).)  Addressing
Dague's request for a contingency enhancement, the court looked
to Circuit precedent, which provided that -`the rationale that
should guide the court's discretion is whether -[w]ithout the
possibility of a fee enhancement . . . competent counsel might
refuse to represent [environmental] clients thereby denying them
effective access to the courts.-'-  (Quoting Friends of the Earth
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 834 F. 2d 295, 298 (CA2 1987)).  Following
this guidance, the court declared that Dague's -risk of not
prevailing was substantial- and that "absent an opportunity for
enhancement, [Dague] would have faced substantial difficulty in
obtaining counsel of reasonable skill and competence in this
complicated field of law."  It concluded that -a 25% enhancement
is appropriate, but anything more would be a windfall to the
attorneys.-  It therefore enhanced the lodestar amount by 25%-
$49,506.87.   The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects.
Reviewing the various opinions in Delaware Valley II, the court
concluded that the issue whether and when a contingency
enhancement is warranted remained open, and expressly disagreed
with the position taken by some Courts of Appeals that the
concurring opinion in Delaware Valley II was controlling.  The
court stated that the District Court had correctly relied on
Circuit precedent, and, holding that the District Court's
findings were not clearly erroneous, it upheld the 25%
contingency enhancement.  935 F. 2d 1343, 1359-1360 (CA2 1991).
We granted certiorari only with respect to the propriety of the
contingency enhancement. 502 U. S. -- (1992).

II

  We first provide some background to the issue before us. Fees
for legal services in litigation may be either -certain- or
-contingent- (or some hybrid of the two).  A fee is certain if it
is payable without regard to the o